We hosted an Zoom Session on May 10, 2020 at 9 am Eastern / 2pm UK / 3pm CET / 9pm Beijing or Singapore / 11pm Sydney / 1am Auckland.
The schedule is as follows:
- 9:00-9:10 Welcome and Overview
- 9:10 – 9:40 Invited talk by Eric Pacuit from the University of Maryland
- 9:40-9:50 Questions and Discussion
- 9:50 – 10:20 Invited talk by Ayumi Igarashi from the National Institute of Informatics
- 10:20-10:30 Questions and Discussion
- 10:30-10:50 2 Min Lightening Talks from our Accepted Papers
- 10:50-?? Discussion and Closing
Links to final versions of the papers can be found below. All blog posts about papers at GAIW are available on our Publication on Medium. If you’d like to view videos of the long version of the talk for each paper we have included many links below. You can also see the GAIW @ AAMAS page on Underline.io.
Split Cycle: A New Voting Method. Eric Pacuit, University of Maryland
Abstract: We introduce a new Condorcet consistent voting method, called Split Cycle. Split Cycle belongs to the small family of known voting methods satisfying independence of clones and the Pareto principle. Unlike other methods in this family, Split Cycle satisfies a new criterion we call immunity to spoilers, which concerns adding candidates to elections, as well as the known criteria of positive involvement and negative involvement, which concern adding voters to elections. Thus, relative to other clone-independent Paretian methods, Split Cycle mitigates “spoiler effects” and “strong no show paradoxes.” This is joint work with Wesley H. Holliday. Working paper: https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.02350
Bio: Eric Pacuit is an associate professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Maryland. Prior to coming to Maryland, Eric completed his PhD in Computer Science at the City University of New York Graduate Center, and was a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute for Logic, Language and Computation at the University of Amsterdam and in the Departments of Philosophy and Computer Science at Stanford University. Eric’s primary research interests are in logic (especially modal logic), game theory, social choice theory, and formal and social epistemology. His research has been funded by the Natural Science Foundation and a Vidi grant from the Dutch science foundation (NWO).
Fair and Efficient Allocation: Moving Beyond Additivity. Ayumi Igarashi from the National Institute of Informatics
Abstract: Fair allocation of divisible and indivisible resource has been the central topic in social choice. Applications are wide and varied, including course allocation, task allocation, property division, and so on. In this talk, I would like to talk about fairness and efficiency issues in resource allocation and review results from classical to more recent ones. In particular, I will explain some recent results beyond the standard class of non-additive valuations, as well as obstacles we may face in such settings. Based on joint work with Nawal Benabbou, Mithun Chakraborty, Yair Zick.
Bio: Ayumi Igarashi is an assistant professor at National Institute of Informatics, Japan. Prior to this, she spent two years as a JSPS postdoctoral fellow, hosted by Prof. Satoru Iwata at University of Tokyo and by Prof. Makoto Yokoo at Kyushu University. She completed her PhD at the Department of Computer Science, the University of Oxford under the supervision of Prof. Edith Elkind. Her broad area of research interests includes algorithmic game theory, computational social choice, and combinatorial optimization.
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