About

Games, Agents and Incentives is a confederated workshop which focuses (obviously…) on agents and incentives in AI.  In particular on game theory (cooperative and non-cooperative), social choice, and agent-mediated e-commerce aspects of AI systems. The confederated workshop merges multiple workshops that have been associated with AAMAS in the past, which considered different aspects of the general interplay between AI and economics:

• CoopMAS: Cooperative Games in Multi-agent Systems

• AMEC:  Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce

• EXPLORE: Exploring Beyond the Worst Case in Computational Social Choice

Over the past two decades, the focus of agent incentives in decentralised and centralised AI systems has increased dramatically. These issues come up when designing preference aggregation mechanisms and markets; computing equilibria and bidding strategies; facilitating cooperation among agents; and fairly dividing resources.

Important Dates

  • Submission Deadline: February 16th, 2020
  • Acceptance Notification: April 1st, 2020

The focus on incentives in AI at AAMAS can be judged from the significant proportion of technical program sessions which deal with them: “economic paradigms”; “mathematical social sciences”; “auctions and markets”; “non-cooperative games”; “cooperative games”; “social choice” and others. The goal of the workshop is to provide a forum to present the latest research, including more preliminary research that can benefit from further discussion and feedback.

The workshop fits very well with the type of research valued by the AAMAS communities. For example, in the last 20 years, 6 out of the 12 winners of the IJCAI Computer and Thought Award worked on topics in the intersection of AI and economics/AGT: specifically, Sarit Kraus (1995), Nicholas Jennings (1999), Tuomas Sandholm (2003), Peter Stone (2007), Carlos Guestrin (2009), Vincent Conitzer (2011), and Ariel Procaccia (2015). Similarly, 8 of the 11 awardees of the Victor Lesser IFAAMAS Distinguished Dissertation Award work on topics at the intersection of AI and Economics: Vincent Conitzer (2006), Radu Jurca (2007),  Ariel Procaccia (2008), Andrew Gilpin (2009), Bo An (2010), Manish Jain (2013), Yair Zick (2014), and Nisarg Shah (2016).

Papers will be invited under the following topics:

  • Algorithmic mechanism design
  • Auctions
  • Behavioral Game Theory
  • Bounded rationality
  • Cooperative Games
  • Computational advertising
  • Computational aspects of equilibria
  • Computational social choice
  • Coalitions, coordination, collective action, and cooperation
  • Economic aspects of security and privacy
  • Economic aspects of distributed and network computing
  • Equilibrium computation
  • Empirical approaches to e-markets
  • Fairness (in ML & elsewhere)
  • Fair Division
  • Incentives in machine learning
  • Information and attention economics
  • Learning in games (e.g., solution concepts and equilibria)
  • Matching and Matching Markets
  • Negotiation
  • Price differentiation and price dynamics
  • Social networks
  • Trading agent design and analysis 
  • Uncertainty in AI and economics